# Demobilisation and the programme for disengaged combatants > How Somalia has demobilised fighters: militia hand-overs in 2007, the 2013 national programme for people leaving al-Shabaab, screening, the Serendi centre, amnesty offers, children, and the debate. Source page: https://calankii.com/en/institutions/disengaged-combatants-programme/ Last checked: 2026-11-12 Publisher: Calankii (https://calankii.com) ## In short Somalia has no single disarmament programme for all armed groups. The main programme since 2013 deals with people who leave [al-Shabaab](/en/history/al-shabaab/). This page records how it works and what researchers have found, without taking sides. ## Earlier hand-overs After Ethiopian and government forces entered Mogadishu at the end of 2006, faction leaders including [Musa Sudi Yalahow](/en/people/musa-sudi-yalahow/), [Mohamed Qanyare Afrah](/en/people/mohamed-qanyare-afrah/) and [Osman Ali Atto](/en/people/osman-ali-atto/) were reported in January 2007 to be among the first to hand their militias to the government ([Wikipedia, Musa Sudi Yalahow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Musa_Sudi_Yalahow), citing SomaliNet). Senior figures who later left al-Shabaab, such as [Mohamed Said Atom](/en/people/mohamed-said-atom/) in 2014 and [Mukhtar Robow](/en/people/mukhtar-robow/) in 2017, did so by public surrender to the federal government. ## The national programme, 2013 The National Programme for the Treatment and Handling of Disengaged Combatants and Youth at Risk was set up in 2013 to give residential care to men leaving al-Shabaab and to children associated with armed forces and groups. In 2019 it added rehabilitation for women formerly associated with al-Shabaab, and in 2020 a community reintegration stage with education, job training, mental health support and monthly allowances ([IOM and UNICEF project document, UN Peacebuilding Fund, 2022](https://mptf.undp.org/sites/default/files/documents/2022-12/prodoc_gtw_220223_0.pdf)). RUSI researchers describe five parts: outreach, including radio amnesty appeals by political leaders; reception, with transfer to the [National Intelligence and Security Agency](/en/institutions/nisa/) (NISA); screening by NISA into "high-risk" cases, sent to military courts, and "low-risk" cases offered a centre; rehabilitation at four official centres in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismayo and Beledweyne; and reintegration support ([James Khalil and others, *Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia*, RUSI, January 2019](https://www.almendron.com/tribuna/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/deradicalisation-and-disengagement-in-somalia.pdf)). ## Serendi The Serendi centre in Mogadishu is residential and semi-open, with stays of about six or seven months and up to a year. Residents may opt out, in which case they return to NISA. The 2019 RUSI study found that 241 men had completed the programme through the formal exit process set up in 2015, with 62 in residence; most came from outside Banadir, from [Lower Shabelle](/en/infrastructure/k50-airstrip/), Middle [Juba](/en/economy/farming-and-harvests/), [Hiiraan](/en/regions/hiiraan/) and [Galgaduud](/en/regions/galgaduud/). More than two-thirds of those interviewed said amnesty offers by successive presidents had substantially motivated them to leave (RUSI, 2019). ## Amnesty The RUSI study recorded that the programme rested on the amnesty announced by President [Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo](/en/people/mohamed-abdullahi-farmaajo/) in April 2017, the latest of several such appeals, but that these had only been announced verbally and were not defined in law, which made it hard to explain who was eligible and what they would receive (RUSI, 2019). ## Children On 3 July and 6 August 2012 the government signed two UN action plans to end the recruitment and use of children by its forces and the killing and maiming of children; in 2014 the defence minister signed procedures requiring that children captured or released from armed forces or groups be handed to UN-led reintegration centres. The IOM and UNICEF document records that full compliance has been hard to achieve, and that in 2017 the defence ministry ordered a ban on recruiting anyone under 18 (IOM and UNICEF, 2022). ## The debate A 2023 RUSI review of Serendi found a well-run centre with capable Somali staff, but recommended less emphasis on centres and more on reintegration as the main aim ([Martine Zeuthen, RUSI, 11 April 2023](https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/policy-briefs/treatment-and-handling-disengaged-combatants-somalia-challenges-and-recommendations)). The IOM and UNICEF document likewise argued for community-based programmes for young people in Baidoa, Kismayo, Jowhar and Dhusamareb (IOM and UNICEF, 2022). The clan militias raised for the 2022 offensive pose a separate demobilisation question; see [Macawisley](/en/institutions/macawisley/). ## Sources differ - **Legal basis.** The programme relies on presidential amnesty announcements that, as of the 2019 study, had no written legal framework. - **Numbers.** Published figures cover single centres at single dates; no complete national total has been found. ## Read the primary sources yourself - James Khalil, Rory Brown, Chris Chant, Peter Olowo and Nick Wood, *Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia*, RUSI Whitehall Report 4-18 (2019): [PDF](https://www.almendron.com/tribuna/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/deradicalisation-and-disengagement-in-somalia.pdf). - IOM and UNICEF, project document for the UN Peacebuilding Fund (2022): [PDF](https://mptf.undp.org/sites/default/files/documents/2022-12/prodoc_gtw_220223_0.pdf). --- I want to help with this: email hello@calankii.com. 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